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Abdelkhalek, S; Zayed, T; Eltoukhy, A E E (2025) Multifaceted optimization for bridge inspection process. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Afolabi, A; Yusuf, A; Akanmu, A (2025) Effect of a passive shoulder-support exoskeleton on muscle activity, range of motion, discomfort, and exertion during painting tasks. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Ahmed, K; Leung, M Y; Yang, W; Manu, P (2025) Moderating effects of coping behaviors on stressor-stress relationships of ethnic minority construction workers. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Bhattacharjee, K; Bugalia, N; Mahalingam, A (2025) Differences in pathways to resilient safety culture for construction projects of different sizes. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Chen, Z; Li, T; Qin, L; Jiang, Y (2025) Vision-guided autonomous block loading in a dual-robot collaborative handling framework. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Cuervo, J C and Pheng, L S (2003) Significance of location factors for Singapore transnational construction corporations. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 10(5), 342–53.
Fares, A; Elazouni, A; Al-Alawi, M (2025) Using game theory to negotiate win-win payment terms between contractors and subcontractors. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Fernández, A I; Jarufe, J; Segarra, P; Cavieres, P (2025) Management of construction planning process in massive underground mining by integrating LPS and cit through action research. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Hong, W T; Whyte, J; Xue, J (2025) A natural language processing-driven framework for policymaking in infrastructure development. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Lee, D; Han, K (2025) Autonomous navigation and positioning of a real-time and automated mobile robotic welding system. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Sciulli, G; Rizzo, P; Kurlander, J; Brozik, B (2025) A comparative analysis of three methodological frameworks for bridge asset management. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Shehadeh, A; Alshboul, O (2025) Game theory integration in construction management: A comprehensive approach to cost, risk, and coordination under uncertainty. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Thiruvenghadam, T S; Prakash, A (2025) Emerging paradigms and practices in construction equipment management. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Umair, M; Seo, J; Luo, Y; Ahn, C R (2025) Investigating the impact of virtual reality accident experience on construction workers' risk habituation through individual behaviors. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Uthai, T; Zhou, T; Ye, Y; You, H; Du, J (2025) Haptics-based robot teleoperation for soft object manipulation. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Wang, M; Yao, G; Yang, Y; Li, R; Deng, R (2025) A decision support tool for dust prevention and control in construction. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Xia, N; Ding, S; Zhai, F; Xia, M (2025) Sharing psychological safety climate at the group level among construction workers: The roles of group identification and interactional justice. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Yllmaz, M; Dede, T (2025) Optimizing multiobjective time-cost-quality problems in construction projects: Efficacy of strength Pareto-based rao algorithms. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
Zhou, Y; Liu, J; Pu, X; Ding, Y (2025) Signaling game analysis of transfer mechanisms of PPP projects: Considering investors' moral hazard and adverse selection behavior. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 151(5).
- Type: Journal Article
- Keywords: opportunistic behavior; public–private partnership (PPP) projects; signaling game; transfer mechanism
- ISBN/ISSN: 0733-9364
- URL: https://doi.org/10.1061/JCEMD4.COENG-15384
- Abstract:
At the end of the concession period of a public–private partnership (PPP) project, investors transfer the project to the government. As the party with an information disadvantage, it is difficult for the government to accurately judge the project quality. Investors may conceal the true quality information of the project to obtain a higher transfer price. This will harm the interests of the government and society. Therefore, we introduce a theoretical method of the signaling game to analyze the probability judgment of the government on quality information. The impact of different transfer modes on the investors' disclosure of true information about project quality and behavior of moral hazard is analyzed. The results show that the difference in the transfer prices, the disguised cost, and the reputation value are important factors in determining the strategy choice of investors. The government should use the transfer mechanism of transfer price differentiation in the transfer stage of PPP projects and formulate a reasonable transfer price difference of projects. This cannot only realize the screening of project quality information by the government but also inhibit the opportunistic behavior of investors during the franchise period and promote the sustainable development of PPP projects. Practical Applications: Selecting an appropriate transfer mechanism is pivotal for the sustainability of PPP projects. This study examines the effects of transfer mechanisms on investors' adverse selection and moral hazard, proposing strategies to mitigate speculative behaviors. It offers recommendations for government and investor quality information disclosure during the transfer phase to enhance project sustainability. First, when effective regulatory oversight exists, uniform pricing or gratuitous transfers are preferable; otherwise, differentiated transfer pricing is advised. Second, for projects where quality is highly influenced by human factors, differentiated pricing effectively deters speculative behavior, while stringent regulatory measures may be necessary in other cases. Third, enhancing transparency and using advanced quality inspection can mitigate adverse selection. Finally, sustaining PPP projects requires strict adherence to contractual principles, ensuring a balance between output and returns, and fostering positive government demonstration effects.